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I.

DEFINING"PROPERTY" IN TAKINGS ADJUDICATION

The Constitution's Takings Clause requires governments in
this country to pay for any property they take from private owners.' The bounds of this requirement's coverage are disputed,
within limits. Most agree that coverage extends beyond cases of
express, formal appropriation and of total physical takeover by
the government. No one, however, says it reaches every single instance of governmental incursion or restriction on private owners' preexisting deployments and enjoyments of what they own.
Whether payment is constitutionally required for this or that
partial incursion or restriction is always, therefore, a question for
decision by responsible officers-judges, in the last resort. Decision requires a method for deriving the antecedent scope and
content of a constitutionally safeguarded "property" interest, because if the governmentally discommoded deployment or enjoyment is not within that scope, then, in a constitutional sense, no
"property" is taken.
According to a so-called positivist view, a property holding's
scope is always necessarily hostage to state lawmaking.
"Property," in this view, consists of nothing but the law's confirmation of entitlements and prerogatives to possessors or other
aowners." Property's content, therefore, can be nothing but the
sum of whatever such confirmations a state's laws from time to
time see fit to include.2 For example, if the laws deny landowners

t Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. This Article was commissioned for and presented at an American Enterprise Institute conference on legal and
economic perspectives on takings held in March 1996.
' See US Const, Amend V ("IN]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."); US Const, Amend XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.'); Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1028 n 15 (1992) (confirming "incorporation" of Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause in Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
2 See, for example, Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation 111-13 (Rothman reprint 1987 of C.K. Ogden ed 1931):
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the freedom to build houses at the seashore, then, by the same
token, "property" does not encompass this freedom. Can such an
accordion-like conception of property possibly serve as the baseline for constitutional "taking" determinations? If it did, then arguably there could be no such constitutionally cognizable event
as a "regulatory taking;"3 the compensation mandate would be
confined to cases of (1) legally unauthorized incursions by misbehaving government agents, and (2) formal expropriations from
private to government ownership. Such a result strikes Professor
Epstein and many others as plainly out of whack with the design
of the Takings Clause to serve as a shield against majoritarian
abuse. In order, they say, to honor this power-limiting design, we
have to read into the clause some already fixed conception of the
core content of an "ownership" or "property" entitlement. This
conception must be one that can withstand on-going modifications of state law by majoritarian organs of government, because
only such a securely trans-majoritarian property baseline can
ground a contention that majoritarian
lawmaking has en4
croached on the claimant's "property."

Let us for now agree on the need in constitutional law for a
trans-majoritarian standard of encroachment on property. How
and whence to draw the requisite standard? Before us are two
competing responses, Epstein's and the Supreme Court's. I want
to postpone my account of the Court's approach. Under Epstein's
proposal, the baseline for constitutional-legal protection of propProperty is nothing but a basis of expectation . . . of deriving certain advantages
from a thing which we are said to possess [which] can only be the work of law ....
Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases.
The argument, in property-talk, would be that all property titles are already subject
from the moment of acquisition to the regulatory servitude of the state-or, in other
words, all titles always have conceptually built into them the liability to redefinition by
regulatory lawmaking. Accordingly, acts of regulatory lawmaking would register not as
transfers of entitlements but rather as the state's exercise of an entitlement that it has
held all along.
' See Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard
v Robins, 64 U Chi L Rev 21, 24-27 (1997). In the words of Justice Antonin Scalia: "[11f the
protection against physical appropriations of private property [is] to be meaningfully enforced, the government's power to redefine the range of interests included in the ownership of property [is] necessarily constrained by constitutional limits." Lucas, 505 US at
1014. It does not follow, though, that the "limits" must take the form of a constitutionally
entrenched conception of "property's" core content. Another approach is to focus on
changes in law, treating as compensable "takings of property" a state's impositions of
losses by alterations of regulatory law that unfairly defeat an owner's "distinct, investment-backed expectations." Id at 1019 n 8, quoting Penn Central TransportationCo v
New York City, 438 US 104, 124 (1978). It is hyperbole, therefore, when Epstein proclaims that rejecters of core-content "baselines" for constitutionally protected property
never propose alternative "substantive baseline[s]." See Epstein, 64 U Chi L Rev at 23
(cited in note 4).
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erty would be taken directly from the general common law of
trespass and nuisance. We can follow Epstein in calling this a
"natural" standard because Epstein, for reasons we shall soon
notice, decidedly treats the common law as an expression of right
reasoning in the service of natural human interests.' The natural
standard has roots in a theory of governmental legitimacy attributed by Epstein to Locke, according to which the government can
have only the pooled powers that its constituents would have had
in a state of nature.6 On the present occasion, though, Epstein is
less occupied with deep matters of political justification than he
is with a more proximately instrumentalist defense of a common
law baseline for unconstitutional property encroachment. Such a
baseline promises, he says, the kind of rigor and objectivity required for effective judicial restraint of majoritarian excess without undue politicization of the judiciary. Notice, though, that this
claim for the rigor and objectivity of the common law standard
depends on Epstein's readiness to take a rather strong-armed
approach to what he knows lawyers often find a somewhat
shapeless, untidy, and refractory corpus juris. Avoiding "rights
skepticism," he says, means rationally reconstructing the materials, distilling from them their "'brooding omnipresence."'7
Epstein's move to rational reconstruction raises, in turn, the
question of what authority he can summon for his resulting constitutional-legal prescriptions. Right reason has its hold on
American constitutional consciousness, but so have tradition and
consent. Epstein understandably wants the support of them all,
the historically embedded as well as the more transcendently
speculative factors. My suggestion here is that he does not and
cannot succeed in having them all. In order to have his way with
the takings issue, Epstein would have to persuade the country
that he is offering the rightly reasoned answer to this issue, in
the teeth of the country's actually prevailing, historical understandings and commitments to the contrary.
II.

IN DEFENSE OF PRUNEYARD

A. The Public Interest
PruneYard involves a state law stripping private mall owners of rights to expel political leafleteers, rights that presumably
See text accompanying notes 18-19.
See Epstein, 64 U Chi L Rev at 26-27 (cited in note 4); Richard A. Epstein, Takings:
PrivatePropertyand the Powerof Eminent Domain 12-13 (Harvard 1985).
Epstein, 64 U Chi L Rev at 24-25 (cited in note 4) (citation omitted).
PruneYard Shopping Center v Robins, 447 US 74 (1980).
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would otherwise have been theirs. Epstein sharply questions
whether such a law serves any constitutionally valid public "use"
or interest. True, he concedes that the PruneYard law passes the
test of public use as currently construed, and he accordingly confines his official legal attack to the law's failure to compensate
for taken property.' I cannot skirt the issue in my response, however. My rejoinder to the compensation claim will be that the
state's action in this case merely offsets a harm to an important
public interest that the mall operation would otherwise be causing. It will, therefore, be incumbent on me to rebut Epstein's
diametrically opposed denial of any legitimate public interest
served by the law.
First, however, we must clear away a side issue. As Epstein
accurately reports, my defense of PruneYard depends on attributing certain values, objectives, and policies to California
"lawmakers." ° He protests in response that only judges and not
popular bodies brought forth the property-restrictive doctrine
that he criticizes." But that is not precisely true because the
California Supreme Court based its ruling on a legislative text:
Article I, Section 2 of the California Constitution. 2 But let us
grant-as I imagine Epstein would insist-that the court's interpretation of the constitutional text was an activist one; or let us
suppose that the ruling was purely common law based. In the
eyes of the United States Supreme Court this ruling would still
have had the status of a legal-policy declaration by duly authorized legal-policy declarers of the state, namely, its common law
or interpretively activist judiciary." Because such a judiciary is
incontestably "republican,"'4 California's making it a part of state
See Epstein, 64 U Chi L Rev at 35 (cited in note 4).

II Id at 43-44.

See id.
2 "Every person may freely speak... his or her sentiments on all subjects ....A law
may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech." Robins v PruneYardShopping Center, 23
Cal 3d 899, 592 P2d 341, 346 (1979), quoting Cal Const, Art I, § 2.
13In referring to the court's law-declaring function as one of policy declaration, I do
not mean that the court steers by "policy" as opposed to "principle" in the sense of those
terms as introduced by Ronald Dworkin. See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, Taking
Rights Seriously 82-84 (Harvard 1977). I am happy to assume that when courts declare
policy, they do so as required, in their best judgment, by legal principles of right and
wrong that they find in a "moral reading" of the law. See, for example, Ronald Dworkin,
Freedom's Law 1-38 (Harvard 1996).
" See US Const, Art WV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican form of government."). One cannot maintain with a straight face (and
least of all can Professor Epstein) that a strong common lawmaking judiciary, or one that
gives a "moral reading" to constitutional clauses, is unrepublican by American constitutional standards-at least as long as the court's actions are subject to override by popularly based lawmaking, a condition that is notoriously satisfied in California.
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government is no concern of the Supreme Court's. Nor is it any of
ours here. Granted, the state court's PruneYard decision may
have been both unanticipated by California's constitutional
framers and surprising to the state's current voters. Howevercontrary to Epstein's suggestion-my PruneYard defense rests
nothing on contemporaneous majority approval of the aims and
policies it attributes to California lawmakers.
My defense does envision California's authorized legal-policy
declarers acting purposively on behalf of a specific public interest
or "use"--that consisting in provision of what we can call a civic
common. A civic common is a site that not only accommodates
cerebral exchanges of ideas but, at the same time, generates a
supportive good that we may call civic sociability, an aspect of
what others have recently been calling "social capital."'" This
good, as I envision California policymakers conceiving it, depends
on there being actual places where people meet each other over
matters of common concern in the course of daily life. Suppose,
now, that authorities in some state use eminent domain powers
to take from each mall owner in the state the public easement
required to sustain a civic common on each mall site. Epstein
questions whether such a taking would be for a constitutionally
proper public use. His doubt seems to fly in the face of a boilerplate proposition of American common and constitutional law:
the "time out of mind" tradition of impressment-by-operation-oflaw of a civic-commoning easement on governmentally owned
streets, plazas, and parks. 6 Given that doctrine, which Epstein
does not question,' how can he possibly doubt that provision by
government action of public-commoning spaces, within privately
owned but otherwise fumctionally similar sites, is a constitutionally proper public use?
He doubts it, he says, because he doubts that a public use occurs when someone enters your land "for partisan political purposes."" That seems rather obviously to miscast the issue, which
would appear to be not the "publicness" of any particular entry
but the "publicness" of a general politicking privilege available to
everyone. Epstein nevertheless persists with the idea that there
is something deeply constitutionally amiss here, respecting
" See, for example, Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J Democracy 65, 67 (Jan 1995) ("'[S]ocial capital' refers to features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.").
" See Hague v Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 US 496, 515 (1939)
(Roberts opinion).
"See Epstein, 64 U Chi L Rev at 44 (cited in note 4).
Id at 34.
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equality and free speech. There is, he says, an untoward
"viewpoint" discrimination when government devotes its powers
and funds to impressment of a civic common on otherwise private
land, for it seems that "some speakers (usually those who are
left-wing and anti establishment types) will be far more likely to
commandeer these resources than will other speakers." 9 What
"discrimination" does he mean? Does he mean the relative advantage accruing to would-be speakers who actually want to
make active use of the state-impressed common, by comparison
with those who do not?" Given a public-wide, content-neutral,
state-supported legal privilege to politick at the mall, Epstein
would then be saying that some will have use for it and some will
not, and those who do not (perhaps because they are able to obtain access to preferred channels of influence) are the victims of a
discriminatory subsidy. But of course the same "discrimination"
applies without a hitch to the traditional civic-common servitude
on governmentally owned streets and squares. So if it is this discrimination that Epstein means, it would be hard to square his
view with the American constitutional and common law tradition
of state support-indeed, mandatory state support-for civiccommoning.
What other "discriminations" are in sight? The state is
plainly preferring the special interests that some people have in
civic-commoning as a channel of political communication, over
the no less special interests held by profit-motivated mall owners
and by those who seek to evade "political controversy."2 This
preference is not, however, a discrimination between one person's
speech and another's; it is not remotely a case of "restrict[ing] the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others .
*..."22 Calling it on the constitutional
carpet seems just another form of rejection of our law's seemingly

,Id at 52.
Note that, so far as the "public use" issue is concerned, there is no compelled special
contribution from any landowner, because the assumption is one of a duly compensated
express taking by eminent domain.
2 Epstein, 64 U Chi L Rev at 44 (cited in note 4). In suggesting that the mall owners'
and (as he supposes) shoppers' preference for freedom from politicking defeats the public
use claim, Epstein seemingly equates "public use" with Pareto-superiority: absence of
self-assessed detriment to anyone from a state-imposed property redeployment. See id at
34 (That "neither the owners nor the shoppers receives a benefit" falsifies the premise of
"benefit to all."). That suggested equation seems indefensible. Condemnation of the
PruneYard for public road construction would be incontestably constitutional, no matter
how strongly, sincerely, and understandably the mall's owners, lessees, and customers
would have preferred otherwise, even after all the constitutionally requisite compensation had been paid.
Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 48-49 (1976).
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settled acceptance of the constitutional merit of civic-commoning
as a true public value. States, in other words, are free to prefer
the public values of their choice over interests in proprietary exclusivity-always, of course, subject to non-discrimination duties
and to the First, Third, and Fourth Amendments, and sometimes
to a compensation requirement. But then what about the exaction of "subsidies" from mall owners to support other people's political speech,23 or the special burdening of mall owners as opposed to other possible providers (including the taxpayers) of
sites for civic-commoning? These questions take us beyond the issue of public use to that of the mall owners' rights to compensation for their burdens.2 4
B.

The Right to Compensation

First, several arguendo stipulations in Epstein's favor: (1) a
measurable detriment flows to mall owners (and others for whom
they proxy-some lessees, some shoppers) from the state's impressment of civic-commoning easements on mall sites;2 5 (2) owners do not waive their rights against non-shopper interlopers by
opening their gates to shoppers; 26 (3) as a prima facie rule, the
Constitution requires states to compensate for losses occasioned
by regulatory lawmaking that restricts landowners' presumptive
freedom to exclude others at will.2 Epstein's proposed common
law standard of constitutional property protection, however, inevitably carries with it a qualification of this prima facie rule: the
rule cannot then apply to restrictions fairly designed to rectify
deployments of affected land that lawmakers-judicial or parliamentary-could aptly classify as nuisances.2 8
In the vocabulary offered by Carol Rose, civic commons are
comedic, not tragic.29 Their characteristic vulnerability is not to
overuse but to underuse; for them, "the more the merrier.""
See Epstein, 64 U Chi L Rev at 52 (cited in note 4).
If, as I contend below, a public easement at the mall for civic-commoning compensates the public for losses of social capital that are fairly attributable to mall development, then one cannot complain of either a subsidy or an unfair burden.
See Epstein, 64 U Chi L Rev at 48-49 (cited in note 4).
See id at 36-40.
See id at 22.
A point about the common law category of public nuisance that Epstein does not notice in his discussion is that the common law traditionally contained an invitation to parliamentary bodies, along with judicial ones, to play their parts in defining offenses
against the public weal. See generally John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 Colum J Envir L 1 (1993).
Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property,53 U Chi L Rev 711 (1986).
' See id at 768.
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Lawmakers may conclude with good reason that processes of
suburban and exurban development have been a direct contributing cause of the socially costly degradation suffered by urbancenter spaces. Furthermore, these destructive exurbanizing processes (which is not to say that the processes have not also been
constructive) have been fueled by the private provision of shopping malls, which have contributed to the destruction of urbancenter civic commons and their attendant social capital. Why
would not this platitudinous observation give the lawmakers just
cause to require the mall developers, or their successors in title,
to contribute in apt fashion to replacing the social values their
profit-seeking pursuits have helped to destroy?3 ' Where, in such
circumstances, is the justice of making the public pay off the developers for costs of replacing what the developers' self-serving
actions have helped to ruin? Why, indeed, should judges or other
lawmakers not be free to identify as a public nuisance actions
contributing to the degradation of pre-existing, urban-center social capital?
A common law nuisance claim contains propositions both
about a legally established public interest and about a legally
culpable manner of harming that interest. If the first proposition
is unsustainable, the claim fails for want of a legally cognizable
harm. If the second proposition is unsustainable, the claim fails
by reason of privilege: a legally cognizable harm may have been
proximately caused by someone creating a shopping mall but
that act is nevertheless not a legal "injury" or wrong-the case is
then one of damnum absque injuria. Notwithstanding Epstein's
suggestion to the contrary, impairment of a civic common should
clearly register as damnum in our jurisprudence, a harm in the
eyes of the law.3 2 The question remains whether producing such a
harm by the seemingly innocent act of creating a mall is injuria
and legally rectifiable. On Epstein's view, an answer unsullied by
politics must be discoverable in a rational reconstruction of nuisance law. What, then, is that answer?
Epstein says the case does not strike him as falling easily
into an itemized list of public nuisance case types provided by the
Dean of Torts.3 3 But of course a gestalt judgment here, insofar as

" For a case of judicial-law declarers apparently reasoning in just this fashion, see
New Jersey CoalitionAgainst War in the Middle East v J.M.B. Realty Corp, 138 NJ 326,
650 A2d 757 (1994), cert denied, Short Hills Associates v New Jersey CoalitionAgainst
War in the Middle East, 116 S Ct 62 (1995).
See Section II.A.
See Epstein, 64 U Chi L Rev at 41-43 (cited in note 4).

1997]

Takings Exchange

that is what Epstein may intend,3 4 would not be very insulable
against the partisan views of the applier. There is the further
problem, too, that the Dean's list may be somewhat unsystematic. For example, it includes "obstructing . . . a stream," but
omits mention of the diversion of waters from a stream that impairs socially valued downstream uses. 5 Prosser's omission is a
convenient one for Epstein, because once the diversion of waters
case is on the table, one cannot easily deny either that it is standard nuisance material 6 or that an analogy between it and our
case is detectable. (As between the economically productive or
otherwise non-wanton diversion of water from a stream and the
diversion of civic life from urban centers, has the former any
more than the latter the character of a "physical ... invasion "37
or "crime?"")
What about the common law privilege of competition? It is
certainly true that deeply entrenched in our law is a privilege to
compete trade away from other would-be sellers by offering better mousetraps. Here, however, the state complains of a harm
consisting of a loss of social value output from a site that it owns,
which is quite a different sort of harm from the loss of sales
revenues to product-line competitors. In that respect, our case is
not about a competitive injury;3 9 it is about an environmental
injury. The injury accrues in the form of diminished attendance
at "comedic" public sites, occasioned by acts of others trying to do
what will foreseeably and directly cause this result and standing
to benefit in proportion to their success. Our case at least bears
an arguable analogy to one example well within the ambit of
"nuisance" classification: non-malicious but objectively intentional pollution of a public natural resource by the defendant's
self-benefiting, but otherwise lawful and commendable, act. But
perhaps the fairest characterization of our case is that it is a confusing mixture of both competitive and environmental injury.
Perhaps that makes it a hard case at common law and thus one
that's legitimately decidable either way.4 ° If so, then under a
I deal below with rational reconstruction or distillation of a controlling principle.
W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosser& Keeton on the Law of Torts § 90 at 643-45 (West
5th ed 1984 & Supp 1988).
' Nothing turns for present purposes on the common law's habit of subsuming this
case under the specific heading of "riparian rights" rather than residual, catch-all
"nuisance."
Epstein, 64 U Chi L Rev at 42 (cited in note 4).
Id.
See id at 42-43.
"Legitimately decidable either way" does not mean that the judicial decider is free
to pick her personally preferred result, as opposed to reporting her best judgment as to
the best legal answer. It means that competent and sincere judicial deciders will fairly
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common law baseline for constitutional "property," the mall
owner seeking compensation is whistling in the wind, because
the risk of having hard cases decided against you is surely a part
of what you buy into in a common law system.4 1
Have I, perhaps, made the case "hard" when it really is not,
by overplaying the (notorious) shapelessness of the nuisance corpus juris? Have I, in other words, overlooked the crucial reliance
of Epstein's argument on rational reconstruction? I have had rational reconstruction very much in mind, but I believe that a resort to it can do no better for Epstein than take him from the
frying pan to the fire, from indeterminacy to politicization.
There can be no fairer test, I assume, than Epstein's own
suggested distillation of nuisance law's "brooding omnipresence":
"[M]aximize the joint value of all properties subject to law, subject to the side constraint of equality of rights between neighbors."42 Given (a) our law's glaringly strong positive valuation of
civic-commoning as social capital, and (b) the commonplace observation of a causal link between suburban shopping mall development and the depletion of this kind of social capital elsewhere, what is outlandish about a lawmaker's judgment that
joint value is maximized by a rule requiring capital replacement
by mall developers?43 After all, if the mall does not strike expectant investors as a winning proposition after covering the costs of
replacing any social capital destroyed by its introduction, then
maybe it is a net socially costly project that ought not to be built.
Granted, there are several possible counter-considerations: (1)
apportionment to malls in general or to any given mall of a substantial share of responsibility for urban-center social capital destruction could be mistaken; or (2) the malls' typical replacement
costs could significantly exceed both (a) the typical values of the
social capital losses attributable to mall building, and (b) the
typical values of the resulting new civic commons. But guesswork
about such matters is endemic in common law decisionmaking. It
would be hard to dismiss as incompetent or insincere a lawmaker's estimate of the probable efficiency of the PruneYard
law-unless one simply could not accept our law's clear designation of civic-commoning as a weighty social good. Yet that is exand reasonably disagree over what that answer is. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously
at 81 (cited in note 13).
" On the question of judicial decisions as compensable takings, see generally Barton
H. Thompson, Jr., JudicialTakings, 76 Va L Rev 1449 (1990).
42 Epstein, 64 U Chi L Rev at 28 (cited in note 4).
If the answer to that question is "nothing," then there is no further basis for complaining of deviation from equality of rights (assuming that mall development by everyone carries the same exposure).

1997]

Takings Exchange

actly what the United States Supreme Court would have to do in
order to find a compensable event here if the common law, rationally reconstructed as Epstein would do it, is to provide the
takings baseline. In condemning California's rule that the impressment of civic-commoning privileges on shopping malls goes
uncompensated, the Court would have to say that this rule could
not reasonably or fairly be judged to maximize the joint value of
the properties. But saying that would disclose on the Court's part
a dismissiveness toward the civic-commoning value that, given
our legal tradition, could only be classed as biased and partisan.
Such a pronouncement by the Court would be indelibly politicized.
III. FROM PROPERTINESS TO FAIRNESS
Is there a better way? Epstein would have us look outside
the Constitution for a standard of constitutional property protection, to a natural legal reason distilled from common law/private
law materials. How about looking inside the Constitution, to the
Takings Clause itself, for what we can call a political as opposed
to a natural standard-a standard specifically geared to the public law work of differentiating between constitutionally permissible and impermissible government actions, or, in other words,
to policing the engagement between property and democracy? By
a "political" standard I do not mean one that is in any special degree a dictate of majority will as opposed to judicial judgment. I
mean one that reflects judicial elucidation (with specific reference to property) of a complex political ideal, that of constitutional democracy. For example, the purpose of the Takings
Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole,"" and the requisite fairness determination "necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests."45 According to these declarations, protection does
not inhere in any naturalistic notion of property as such. Rather,
it falls out of a judgment of political fairness: if, in the general
context of American constitutionalism, it is unfair for politics to
impose on property in the challenged way without compensation,
then property has been taken, and vice-versa.46 Judicial partisanArmstrong v United States, 364 US 40, 49 (1960) (Harlan dissenting).
Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255, 260-61 (1980).
" Compare William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the PoliticalProcess, 95 Colum L Rev 782, 819-25, 880-82 (1995) (contending,
on both originalist and non-originalist grounds, that the application of the Takings
Clause turns on a political fairness judgment but denying that the Supreme Court's re-
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ship remains, of course, a concern, but the "political" or fairness
approach may fare better in this respect than any resort to a
common law baseline. Better, one might say, to have a constitutional court tackle openly and directly the political fairness concerns that uncompensated regulation sometimes raises, than to
let the judges veto regulatory laws in the name of unprovable
and contestable common law essences.
Is this on my part just a wistful reversion to the halcyon social democratic days of the Warren and Burger Courts? Happily,
the Reagan and Bush Court also seems to have remembered the
poisonous effects of judicial pretensions to discover by reason a
natural constitutional law of property and, despite signs of temptation," to have mainly steered clear. The decisive case is Lucas,
where Justice Scalia referred for an answer not to reason or nature but to "tradition[ I," "compact," and "culture." "[O]ur
'takings' jurisprudence," he wrote,
has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our
citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power over,
the "bundle of rights" that they acquire when they obtain title to property. It seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted,
from time to time, by various measures newly enacted by the
State in legitimate exercise of its police powers; "[a]s long
recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power."

[W]e think the notion... that title to land is ... subject to
the "implied limitation" that the state may subsequently
eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent with
the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that
has become part of our constitutional culture."
I do not find this rhetoric perfect by any means. To my mind,
it goes too far in the direction of displacing judicial accountability
for a fairness judgment onto a "tradition" that I believe no likelier to be objectively decisive in this field, or impervious to particent adjudications adequately reflect this understanding).
" See Frank I. Michelman, Property,Federalism,and Jurisprudence:A Comment on
Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev 301, 320-21 (1993) (uncertainly
spotting a trace of natural lawyering in the Court's appeal to the idea of "essential uses"
of landed property).
' Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1027-28 (1992), quoting
PennsylvaniaCoal Co v Mahon, 260 US 393, 413 (1922).
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sanship, than is legal naturalism or a common law baseline.4 9
But the central idea is right: thoughts of compensation are, by
the prevalent understanding of Americans regarding property's
interface with democracy, simply out of place in most instances,
if not quite all, of regulatory restrictions of land use. American
constitutional democracy's disposition from the beginning has
been to treat the bulk of these events as belonging to the normal
give and take of a progressive, dynamic, democratic society."
Regulation stands, in our public law, as an ordinary part of the
background of risk and opportunity against which we all take our
chances in our roles as investors in property.

' See Michelman, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev at 322-24 (cited in note 47).
' See Treanor, 95 Colum L Rev at 785-91 (cited in note 46).

